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1.1 Introduction
Although the term "smokeless tobacco" (ST) was coined by the tobacco in-
dustry to represent snuffand chewing tobacco as safer alternatives to smoking
cigarettes, ST use has been linked to increased risk for oral cancers and other
types of oral disease (USDHHS 1986a). The prevalence of ST use generally
has been increasing over the past 20 years, particularly among young males
(USDHHS 1992a, 1992b). Understanding factors affecting the likelihood of
ST use thus is important for developing policies aimed at reducing overall
tobacco-related mortality and morbidity. Tobacco researchers have focused
considerable attention on the evaluation of various mechanisms designed to
control cigarette use, including regulation ofeconomic availability through in-
creases in cigarette excise taxes. In contrast, the effects of mechanisms de-
signed to control the availability of ST products on ST use have not been as
extensively studied.
This paper presents estimates ofthe effects oftobacco excise taxes and laws
restricting public smoking on the likelihood ofcurrent use ofdifferent forms
oftobacco (moist snuff and cigarettes) obtained from tobacco use data in the
Current Population Surveys (CPS) for September 1992, January 1993, and
May 1993. The results indicate thatindividuals living in areas with higherciga-
rette tax rates tend to be less likely to smoke cigarettes. Similarly, individuals
living in areas with higher snuff tax rates tend to be less likely to use snuff.
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Laws restricting smoking in workplaces or other public places appear to affect
both cigarette and snuff use. Finally, higher cigarette tax rates are associated
with greater snuffuse, but higher snufftax rates are not associated with greater
cigarette use.
1.2 Background
A 1986 Surgeon General's report on smokeless tobacco use concluded that
the preponderance of evidence suggests numerous adverse health conse-
quences of ST use, including oral cancers, teeth abrasion and discoloration,
gum recession, dental caries, leukoplakia, halitosis, and nicotine dependence
(USDHHS 1986a, 1986b, 1992a). Despite the Surgeon General's report and
the passage of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Act in 1986 (which
mandated warning labels and prohibited television ads for ST products), the
prevalence of ST use in the United States increased in the 1980s, particularly
among young males (USDHHS 1992a, 1992b; FTC 1993). This growth has
been tied to the intensive marketing ofmoist snufftoward young males. From
1970 to 1985, the percent of males aged 16-19 using moist snuff increased
ninefold from 0.3 to 2.9 percent. For all smokeless tobacco products, preva-
lence ofuse among this age group increased from 1.4 to 5.9 percent (Marcus
et al. 1989). Among older males (aged 20 and older), the prevalence of use
increased by 16 percent, from 4.9 to 5.7 percent. By 1991, about 5.6 percent
ofmales aged 18 and older used smokeless tobacco (CDC 1993a).
In contrast, the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the United States has
been decreasing. From 1970to 1985, cigarette smoking declined by 27 percent
among male smokers aged 16-19, and among males aged 20 and older, smok-
ing declined by 25 percent, from 44.3 to 33.2 percent. By 1991, about 28.1
percent ofmales aged 18 and older smoked cigarettes (CDC 1993b). However,
there have been some slight increases in prevalence of cigarette use in the
1990s among some population groups.
A number of factors contributed to the general decline in smoking preva-
lence. Among these factors are various federal and state policies designed to
control access to tobacco products. Excise taxes represent an indirect control
measure, in that the higher prices caused by taxes make tobacco products less
affordable, thereby reducing access. Past studies indicate that higher prices,
created in part by increases in federal and state cigarette tax rates, do reduce
cigarette consumption (e.g., Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1994; Baltagi and
Levin 1986; Keeler et al. 1990; Chaloupka and Saffer 1992; Emont et al. 1993;
Wasserman et al. 1991; Chaloupka 1991; Kenkel 1993; Lewit, Coate, and
Grossman 1981).1
1. The most dramatic evidence ofthis effect is from Canada, where excise tax increases in the
1980s contributed to steep increases in retail cigarette prices; before recent tax roll-backs, taxes
represented about 75 percent ofthe retail price ofcigarettes in Canada. Overthis period, percapita17 Tobacco Taxes, Smoking Restrictions, and Tobacco Use
Less direct, but potentially substantial, costs are imposed on cigarette smok-
ers by laws restricting smoking in various types ofpublic areas or workplaces.
Several studies conclude that laws restricting smoking in public places have
contributed to reduced cigarette use (Keeleretal. 1990; Wasserman et al. 1991;
Emont et al. 1993), though other studies conclude that public place smoking
laws have no effect after taking into account the endogeneity ofthe laws-that
is, areas with low rates of cigarette use are more likely to adopt restrictive
smoking laws than areas with high rates ofcigarette use (Chaloupka and Saffer
1992; Grossman 1991). However, even after accounting for endogeneity, laws
allowing firms to prohibit smoking in the workplace appear to reduce cigarette
use (Chaloupka and Saffer 1992).
Considerable attention has been given to increasing excise taxes on products
such as alcohol and tobacco as a means of health promotion (e.g., Phelps
1988). In 1985, the excise taxes applied to smokeless tobacco products in many
states were low relative to those imposed on cigarettes; at that time, there was
no federal excise tax on smokeless tobacco, and only 21 states levied an excise
tax on smokeless tobacco products. Between 1985 and 1992, 22 states raised
or implemented excise taxes on smokeless tobacco products (Tobacco Institute
1986, 1992). The federal excise tax rate in 1993 was 2.8 cents per 1.2-ounce
can ofsnuff and 2.4 cents per 3-ounce pouch ofchewing tobacco.
Although the use ofexcise taxes to control ST use has been alluded to before
(e.g., USDHHS 1992a), relatively few studies have attempted to quantify the
potential effects of tax increases on ST use (Ohsfeldt and Boyle 1994; Ohs-
feldt, Boyle, and Capilouto 1997; Chaloupka, Grossman, and Tauras 1996).
Ohsfeldt, Boyle, and Capilouto (1997), using 1985 Current Population Survey
data, find a tax elasticity ofsnuffparticipation ofabout -0.3 among males age
16 and older. Chaloupka, Grossman, and Tauras (1996), using data for teenage
males from the 1992, 1993, and 1994 Monitoring the Future Surveys, find a
tax elasticity of snuff participation of about -0.4 and an overall tax elasticity
ofsnuff demand ofabout -0.6. Thus ST use appears to be at least as respon-
sive as cigarette use to changes in its own tax rate.
Studies ofalcohol and illicit drug use have noted that an unintended conse-
quence of more stringent alcohol control measures directed at youth is an in-
crease in the risk of illicit drug use (e.g., DiNardo and Lemieux 1992). It is
possible that increased cigarette excise taxes may increase ST use, ifST excise
taxes remain low relative to cigarette excise taxes. Any impact of a change in
an excise tax applied to one type oftobacco producton the use ofothertobacco
products (i.e., the cross-tax effect) must be taken into account for a complete
assessment ofthe effects ofthe tax change. Some prior studies find significant
cross-tax effects ofcigarette excise taxes on ST use (Ohsfeldt and Boyle 1994;
Ohsfeldt et al. 1997), whereas others find none (Chaloupka et al. 1996).
cigarette consumption declined more rapidly in Canada than in the United States (Kaiserman and
Rodgers 1991).18 Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Raymond G. Boyle, and Eli I. Capilouto
1.3 Data
The September 1992, January 1993, and May 1993 Current Population Sur-
veys (CPS) each provide a nationally representative sample of over 100,000
individuals. In addition to detailed economic and demographic datafor respon-
dents as individuals and households, these CPS files include questions per-
taining to use ofsnuff or chewing tobacco, as well as other forms oftobacco.
Regarding ST use, however, the CPS only provides data for any level of use;
it does not indicate the intensity of use among those using ST products. As
such, only current participation may be determined from the CPS data; there
is no information about frequency or intensity ofST use (i.e., conditional de-
mand). Despite this significant limitation, a key advantage of the CPS data,
given the relative rarity ofST use, is its large sample size, which facilitates age
cohort subanalyses. The public use CPS file also provides state and metropoli-
tan area identifiers, which permits a reasonably accurate assessment ofthe to-
bacco taxes and smoking laws that apply to each survey respondent.
A well-known problem is that the CPS data contain a number of proxy re-
sponses for tobacco use, particularly for teens. Although all surveys eliciting
self-reported tobacco use generally result in systematic underreporting of to-
bacco use, there is the potential for more substantial underreporting ofuse by
proxy respondents. Though self-reported or proxy-reported tobacco use mea-
sures the prevalence of use with error, estimates of the effects of variance in
tobacco taxes on variance in prevalence of tobacco use may be unbiased if
response error is uncorrelated with tax rates or other variables in the demand
model. Using the 1985 CPS data, Ohsfeldt et al. (1997) confirm systematic
underreporting by proxy respondents relative to respondents. However, the
proxy response bias was essentially uncorrelated with the excise tax variables.
Thus, the estimated excise tax coefficients were not substantially affected by
proxy response bias, at least in the 1985 CPS data.
The tobacco tax rate data used are from the Tobacco Institute (1992, 1993).
An "average" excise tax rate for each MSA is calculated as the population-
weighted average ofthe sum ofthe state excise tax and the local excise tax (if
any), where the weights are each local government's share ofthe MSA popula-
tion within a single state. For MSAs spanning state borders, the MSA is split
into the portions within each state. Differences in tax rates ineach part ofthese
multistate MSAs are used to construct two additional variables: the magnitude
ofany positive difference (i.e., higher tax rate in another part ofthe MSA) and
the magnitude ofany negative difference (Le., lower tax rate in another part of
the MSA). These variables are used to account for tax rates in geographically
proximate areas. The state tax rate is used for respondents in non-MSA loca-
tions within a state.
At least some studies indicate that state laws restricting smoking in public
places reduce the demand for cigarettes (Wasserman et al. 1991). Such laws
could encourage the use of smokeless tobacco in place of smoked tobacco
products if smokeless tobacco use is not covered by the laws, if smokeless19 Tobacco Taxes, Smoking Restrictions, and Tobacco Use
tobacco use is more difficult to detect, or if laws as they apply to smokeless
tobacco are less strictly enforced.2
The presence ofstatutes restricting smoking in numerous general categories
of public places is provided by the u.s. Department of Health and Human
Services (1993). No published compilation ofstate laws restricting the public
use of smokeless tobacco is available. However, a computer search of state
statutes pertaining to ST use before 1994 indicated that a handful of states
had statutes specifically prohibiting ST use in public schools; the laws did not
prohibit ST use in other places. Also, a review ofthe smoking restriction stat-
utes in the 10 most restrictive states indicated that the statutes did not specifi-
cally prohibit ST use in places where smoking was prohibited. From this, we
conclude that ST use in most public places was not restricted by state law in
1992 and 1993. We have no datapertaining to any local laws restricting STuse.
Two alternatives are used to quantify the "intensity" ofsmoking restrictions.
First, a smoking regulation index, similar to the index used in Wasserman et
al. (1991), is used.3 This index ranges from zero to one, with one being the
most restrictive. In constructing the index value for a particular MSA, the re-
striction assumed to apply is the more restrictive ofthe state law or local laws
restricting smoking.4 A population-weighted average of the regulation index
for eachjurisdictionwithin the MSA is used as the MSA's "average" regulatory
intensity. For non-MSA areas within states, the state regulation index is used.
Alternatively, the components ofthe smoking regulation index are used as sep-
arate variables.
The CPS data are augmented with selected variables pertaining to popula-
tion characteristics from theArea Resource File (ARF) and religious affiliation
data from Bradley et al. (1992). These county-level data are aggregated to the
level of MSAs and the non-MSA area within states. Several variables per-
taining to the characteristics ofstate governments, taken from Barone and Uji-
fusa (1995, 1993), also are added to the CPS data. Finally, the farm value of
state tobacco production is added to the database.
1.4 Methods
The empirical analysis is motivated by a conceptual model of tobacco use
employed in prior economic studies of cigarette demand (e.g., Wasserman et
al. 1991). These demand models assume cigarette use is affected by price, in-
2. Indeed, a recent ad campaign by United States Tobacco, the leading producer ofsnuffin the
United States, encourages smokers to substitute a snuff product for cigarettes "when you can't
smoke."
3. The index is defined as follows: An area with a law restricting smoking in private workplaces
is assigned a value of 1; an area that does not restrict private workplaces but requires that at least
75 percent ofseating in restaurants be reserved for nonsmoking patrons is assigned a value of.75;
an area with neither of these restrictions that restricts smoking in four or more other areas is
assigned a value of.5; areas with neither ofthe initial two restrictions that restrict smoking in one
to three other places are assigned a value of.25; all other areas are assigned a value ofzero.
4. Local laws generally are more restrictive than state laws.20 Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Raymond G. Boyle, and Eli I. Capilouto
come, smoking regulations, and certain demographic characteristics, such as
age, gender, educational attainment, and household composition. As noted, the
CPS data only permit the probability ofuse ofthe tobacco product to be esti-
mated-that is, the first part of a standard two-part demand model, where the
second part ofa two-part model is the level ofuse among users.
Our model extends the cigarette demand models by examining both ciga-
rette and ST use and by accounting for possible effects oftaxes or regulations
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where Ls is the likelihood of any use of snuff and Lc is the likelihood of any
cigarette use. The independent variables are prices ofcigarettes (Pc) and snuff
(Ps)' personalincome(I), anindexofsmokingregulation (R), and asetofdemo-
graphic characteristics (D). The us are random error terms. The likelihood of
use models are estimated using a logistic regression model (Maddala 1983).
Retail price data for ST products by state are not available. Variance in retail
prices is attributable in part to variance in state and federal ST excise taxes
across states and over time. Most state ST excise taxes are expressed as a per-
centage ofthe wholesale price. The federal excise tax rate applies per unit of
product, not to the wholesale price. Without price data, it is not possible to
combine the state and federal tax rates. However, the nominal federal tax rate
did not change over the study period, and given the modest rate of inflation
over the study period, the real federal tax rate did not change much. Accord-
ingly, the state's snufftax rate is used to represent Ps in the model.
To determine the effect of tobacco excise taxes or smoking restrictions on
tobacco use, the possibility that the size of the excise tax or the intensity of
smoking restrictions is affected by the level of use (i.e., endogenous for the
use rate) should be considered. We use a Hausman test for the null hypothesis
that each ofthe excise tax rate variables and the regulatory intensity variable is
uncorrelated with the errorterm in the tobacco use models. Smith and Maddala
(1983) provide a variation ofthe Hausman test appropriate for probit models.
In cases where the null hypothesis is rejected, an instrumental variable (IV)
approach is used to purge the correlation between the excise tax variables and
the error term in the smokeless tobacco use equations (Maddala 1988). The
impact ofproxy responses on estimated tax elasticities is assessed by estimat-
ing models with and without proxy responses within population groups.
Personal income, adjusted for differences across states in general price lev-
els, is used to capture the ability to pay for tobacco and other products. Educa-
tional attainment, measured as a series ofdummy variables (high school grad-
uate or college graduate, with less than high school graduate as the omitted
category), also is included in the model.21 Tobacco Taxes, Smoking Restrictions, and Tobacco Use
Several demographic variables and state-level variables are included in the
model to capture systematic differences in consumerpreferences for smokeless
tobacco products. Since white males are thought to be at greaterriskthan black
males (Marcus et al. 1989), a binary variable equal to one for black respon-
dents is included in the model. Marital status is often used as an explanatory
variable in smoking studies; thus, a series ofdummy variables for marital sta-
tus are included in the model (never married, divorced/widowed, and sepa-
rated, with married as the omitted category). Fundamentalist Protestant de-
nominations generally have a negative view of tobacco use. The religious
affiliations ofindividual respondents in the CPS data are not known. Variables
indicating the percent ofthe MSA and non-MSA area population who are ad-
herents to fundamentalist Protestant denominations and the percentofthe pop-
ulation with no active religious affiliation, derived from Bradley et al. (1992)
and Smith (1990), are used to try to capture prevailing attitudes about tobacco
use in the area associated with religious beliefs.
1.5 Results
The logistic regression estimates of the cigarette and snuff use models are
presented in tables 1.1 and 1.2. The full sample is restricted to males aged 16
or older who self identify as either white or black (i.e., "other" is excluded).
Forthe September 1992, January 1993, and May 1993 CPS, this yields a usable
sample of 165,653 individuals. Sample means for all model variables are re-
ported in the appendix. This large sample is particularly useful given the rela-
tive rarity ofself-reported snuffuse (about 18 percentofthose in the sample re-
port current cigarette use but only 2 percent report current snuffuse).5
Exogeneity ofthe cigarette tax rate and smoking regulation variables is re-
jected at the 1 percent level for both current cigarette use and current snuff
use, based on a Hausman test using as instruments the exogenous variables in
the tobacco use model and several additional variables: state government ex-
penditures percapita, state political liberalism, an index ofinterparty competi-
tion in state government, and the per capita value ofstate tobacco production.
The apparent endogeneity of these variables may reflect omitted variables in
the tobacco use model (e.g., attitudes about tobacco and tobacco use) affecting
both tobacco use policies regarding cigarette use (cigarette tax rates and smok-
ing restrictions). In contrast, the exogeneity of snuff tax rates cannot be re-
jected. The tobacco use models are estimated with the cigarette tax and smok-
ing regulation variables treated alternatively as exogenous and endogenous
variables.
In terms of tax effects, the results reported in table 1.1 indicate that a 1
percent increase in the cigarette excise tax rate is associated with a reduction
5. Self-reported snuffuse among females is too rare to be analyzed effectively, even in the large
CPS sample.22 Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Raymond G. Boyle, and Eli I. Capilouto
Table 1.1 Logit Estimates ofEffects ofTax Rates and Smoking Restriction
Index on Current Use of Cigarettes or Snuff (Sept. 1992, Jan. 1993,
and May 1993 CPS)
Cigarettes Cigarettes Snuff Snuff
(Exogenous) (Endogenous) (Exogenous) (Endogenous)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cigarette taxa -0.0037* -0.0079* 0.010* 0.044*
Snufftax 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.001*
Regulation indexa -0.141* -0.170* -0.801* -1.542*
Family income -0.014* -0.014* -0.0069* -0.0068*
Occupation
Farm/forestry -0.093* -0.093* 0.333* 0.316*
Management -0.219* -0.217* -0.474* -0.469*
Sales -0.132* -0.131* -0.316* -0.314*
Service 0.185* 0.186* -0.528* -0.552*
Age 16-19 0.017 0.016 0.943* 0.939*
Age 20-24 -0.087* -0.087* 0.774* 0.783*
Age 65 or over -0.621* -0.620* 0.113* 0.121*
White Hispanic -0.354* -0.335* -1.825* -1.864*
Black non-Hispanic -0.313* -0.309* -1.494* -1.476*
Black Hispanic -0.356* -0.339*
High school graduate 0.527* 0.528* 0.376* 0.371*
College graduate -0.712* -0.712* -0.394* -0.391*
Employed 0.792* 0.790* 1.038* 1.038*
Student -0.463* -0.464* 0.313* 0.313*
Never married 0.155* 0.156* 0.085 0.091*
Divorced/widowed 0.743* 0.744* 0.115 0.105
Married with no spouse
present 0.421* 0.424* 0.187 0.160
Child age ~ 5 in
household -0.439* -0.438* 0.199* 0.202*
Child age 6-17 in
household -0.253* -0.253* -0.292* -0.291*
High school graduates (%) -0.0095* -0.0076* -0.0095 -0.158*
Per capita income -0.0016 0.0009 -0.113* -0.118*
Population below poverty
level (%) -0.0016 -0.0024 0.029* 0.017*
Unemployment rate -0.0084* -0.0010 -0.031* -0.068*
Fundamentalists (%) -0.0016* -0.0018* 0.0050 0.010*
No active religion (%) 0.0011 0.0005 0.0032 0.018*
aEndogenous variable in columns (2) and (4).
*Statistically significant at the 1percent level.
in the probability ofcurrent cigarette use by -0.07 percent when the cigarette
tax is treated as exogenous (col. 1), or by -0.15 percent when the cigarette tax
rate is treated as endogenous (col. 2). The estimated impact of snuff tax rates
on snuff use is small in magnitude and not statistically significant when the
cigarette tax rate is treated as exogenous (col. 3). However, when the cigaretteTable 1.2 Estimates ofEffects ofTax Rates and Specific Smoking Restrictions
on Current Use ofCigarettes or Snuff(Sept. 1992, Jan. 1993, and
May 1993 CPS)
Cigarettes Cigarettes Snuff Snuff
(Exogenous) (Endogenous) (Exogenous) (Endogenous)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cigarette taxa -0.0033* -0.0069* 0.011* 0.042*
Snufftax 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0009*
Workplace lawa -0.153* -0.270* -0.225 0.578
Restaurants
(% nonsmoking)a 0.0041 -0.037 0.011* 0.013*
Other places (4+)a 0.025 -0.014 -1.089* -2.150*
Family income -0.014* -0.014* -0.0069* -0.0068*
Occupation
Farm/forestry -0.095* -0.096* 0.384* 0.405*
Management -0.219* -0.217* -0.470* -0.471*
Sales -0.133* -0.131* -0.320* -0.335*
Service 0.184* 0.186* -0.518* -0.544*
Age 16-19 0.017 0.014 0.934* 0.945*
Age 20-24 -0.086* -0.087* 0.775* 0.788*
Age 65 or over -0.622* -0.619* 0.119 0.129
White Hispanic -0.353* -0.323* -1.857* -2.056*
Black non-Hispanic -0.312* -0.309* -1.481* -1.454*
Black Hispanic -0.356* -0.313*
High school graduate 0.527* 0.528* 0.371* 0.367*
College graduate -0.712* -0.710* -0.395* -0.406*
Employed 0.792* 0.790* 1.042* 1.046*
Student -0.463* -0.464* 0.321* 0.337*
Never married 0.154* 0.158* 0.092 0.087
Divorced/widowed 0.744* 0.744* 0.123 0.113
Married with no spouse
present 0.422* 0.427* 0.225 0.197
Child age :::; 5 in
household -0.439* -0.437* 0.199* 0.207*
Child age 6-17 in
household -0.253* -0.252* -0.295* -0.294*
High school graduates (%) -0.0091* -0.0056* 0.630 0.262
Per capita income -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.111* -0.107*
Population below poverty
level (%) -0.0002 -0.0027 0.034* 0.018*
Unemployment rate -0.0082* 0.0008 -0.018 -0.0048
Fundamentalists (%) -0.0013* -0.0013* 0.0098* 0.018*
No active religion (%) 0.0003 0.0012 0.012* 0.020*
aEndogenous variable in columns (2) and (4).
*Statistically significant at the 1percent level.24 Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Raymond G. Boyle, and Eli I. Capilonto
tax rate is treated as endogenous, a 1 percent increase in the snuff tax rate is
estimated to reduce the probability ofsnuffuse by -0.10 percent (col. 4).
In terms ofcross-tax effects, as in Ohsfeldt et al. (1997), higher cigarette tax
rates are associated with a higher probability of snuff use. This is consistent
with the substitution of snuff for cigarettes when the price of cigarettes in-
creases relative to the price of snuff. The cross-tax elasticity, however, is per-
haps implausibly large (about 1.0) when the cigarette tax rate is treated as
endogenous. Also, no corresponding cross-tax effect ofsnufftaxes on cigarette
use is indicated. Itis possible that any substitution into cigarettes by snuffusers
in response to an increase in the relative price ofsnuffmay, given the relatively
small number of snuff users, be swamped by the larger overall prevalence of
cigarette use.
For the model specification using the overall smoking regulation index
(table 1.1), more restrictive smoking regulations are associated with both lower
cigarette use and lower snuff use. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated
effect increases when the regulation index is treated as endogenous. (The usual
argument is that the failure to account for endogeneity would result in an over-
estimate of the impact, because areas with low rates of cigarette use could
more easily pass laws restricting smoking.) The results using the overall smok-
ing regulation index also run counterto the notion that restrictive smoking laws
might cause substitution of cigarettes with snuff. Areas with more restrictive
laws have lower estimated probabilities of snuffuse. Recall, however, that the
smoking restriction laws do not directly constrain the use of snuff. The laws
may discourage snuffuse indirectly by fostering an "antitobacco" environment
for the individual considering snuffuse.
In model specifications where the smoking regulation variable is measured
as its component parts (table 1.2), the results become a bit more muddled.
Consistentwith some past studies, the impactofthe overall smoking restriction
index on cigarette use primarily results from workplace restrictions. However,
workplace smoking restrictions have no statistically significant effect on snuff
use. It appears that restrictions on smoking in "other" places reduce snuffuse.
This may be plausible if snuff use is concentrated among young males who
spend relatively less time in (indoor) workplaces and relatively more time in
"other" places. In contrast, restaurant restrictions appear to increase snuffuse.
This would seem to be the least plausible source ofregulation-induced substi-
tution effects, since snufftypically is not consumed during meals.
Results for other model variables generally are consistent with expectations.
Greater family income is associated with a reduced likelihood of current use
ofeither cigarettes or snuff. White Hispanics and blacks are less likely to use
either cigarettes or snuffthan white non-Hispanics. Individuals in farming and
forestry occupations are less likely to use cigarettes but are more likely to use
snuff, whereas those in service occupations are more likely to smoke but are
less likely to use snuff, compared to reference occupations. Individuals who25 Tobacco Taxes, Smoking Restrictions, and Tobacco Use
Table 1.3 Summary ofModel Estimates, by Age Cohort, for Tobacco Tax Rate and
Smoking Restriction Variables
All Males ~ 16 Males 16-24 Males 25-44 Males> 44
Cigarette use
Cigarette tax (elasticity) -0.15* -0.22* -0.11* -0.07
Snufftax (elasticity) 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002
Overall regulation index
(Ll probability) -0.13* -0.09* -0.19* -0.12*
Workplace law (Ll probability) -0.06* 0.02 -0.09* -0.08*
Restaurants, % nonsmoking
(Ll probability) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.003
Other places, 4+
(Ll probability) -0.002 -0.07* -0.001 -0.01
Snuffuse
Cigarette tax (elasticity) 0.98* 1.15* 0.04 0.54*
Snufftax (elasticity) -0.01* -0.24* -0.05* 0.003
Overall regulation index
(Ll probability) -0.03* -0.001 -0.03* 0.001
Workplace law (Ll probability) 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
Restaurants, % nonsmoking
(Ll probability) 0.01* 0.02* 0.004 0.01*
Other places, 4+
(Ll probability) -0.04* -0.03* -0.02* -0.01
*Statistically significant at the 1percent level.
are not married or have no spouse present are more likely to smoke cigarettes
than currently married individuals with the spouse present.
The tax elasticities and smoking regulation effects estimated for cigarette
and snuff use models for males by age cohort are summarized in table 1.3.
Age cohorts examined include young males (16-24), prime work-age males
(25-44), and older males (over 44). The model specifications employed are
analogous to the models in tables 1.1 and 1.2 treating cigarette tax rates and
smoking regulations as endogenous. The tax elasticities reported correspond
to a model using the overall regulation index variable (as in table 1.1) rather
than the component variables (as in table 1.2). The incremental probability
estimates for the smoking regulations indicate the change in the predicted
probability ofuse given a change in the regulatory variable from 0 to 1, holding
other factors constant at their sample mean values.
Estimated tax elasticities tend to be larger in magnitude for young males
relative to tax elasticity estimates for other males. The elasticity ofthe proba-
bility ofcigarette use with respect to the cigarette tax rate is twice as large in
magnitude for males aged 16-24 than for males aged 25-44. For males over
age 44, the estimated cigarette tax elasticity is not statistically significant. For
snuff, the estimated own tax elasticity is almost five times greater in magnitude
for young males than for males aged 25-44. The large cross-tax effect ofciga-26 Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Raymond G. Boyle, and Eli I. Capilouto
rette tax rates on snuff use indicated in the full sample appears to be mainly
attributable to a large cross-tax effect among young males.
The estimated impact of the overall smoking regulation index on cigarette
use is consistently negative and statistically significant for all three age groups.
Workplace laws appear to have a greater impact on males over age 24 than on
males aged 16-24, whereas restrictions on smoking in "other" places have
more impact on the probability of smoking among young males than among
males over age 24. For snuff use, the impact of the overall regulation index
is most evident among prime work-age males. The odd restaurant restriction
substitution effect found in the full sample is indicated for both young and
older males.
Although in many respects the results are not dramatically different across
age cohorts, in general, tobacco use appears to be more responsive to tax rates
among young males than males over age 24, whereas males over age 24 appear
to be more responsive to smoking regulations than young males.
1.6 Conclusion
Both tobacco tax rates and tobacco use regulations appear to affect the use
ofspecific types oftobacco products. There appear to be some important inter-
relationships among types oftobacco products in terms ofthe impact ofpoli-
cies designed to affect use ofa particular tobacco product. In particular, ciga-
rette tax changes may result in changes in the prevalence ofsnuffuse, at least
among young males. Model estimates suggest that some types ofrestrictions
on smoking may encourage snuffuse, again among young males.
An important limitation of this study is that only current use of tobacco
can be examined using cross-sectional data. It is possible that cross-sectional
associations between tax rates or smoking restrictions and tobacco use would
not be replicated using longitudinal data. Moreover, due to lack of data, the
conditional demand for tobacco (intensity of use among users) could not be
analyzed. Thus, only part ofthe potential response to tax changes or changes
in smoking regulations may be analyzed. Given the relative rarity ofsnuffuse
and the inherent difficulty in quantifying the intensity of snuff use, analyzing
conditional snuffdemand will remain a challenge for future studies.27 Tobacco Taxes, Smoking Restrictions, and Tobacco Use
Appendix
Table lA.l Means and Standard Deviations for Model Variables (Sept. 1992,
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